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COGNITIVE WARFARE IN GLOBAL COMPETITION

Oleh : luska - Jum'at, 20/11/2026 04:41 WIB


COGNITIVE WARFARE IN GLOBAL COMPETITION

*SERIES 8*


*WHEN NATIONS COMPETE TO SHAPE PERCEPTION, LEGITIMACY, AND GEOPOLITICAL DIRECTION*


*By Brig. Gen. (Ret.) MJP. Hutagaol*


*1. WORLD COMPETITION DOES NOT ALWAYS START WITH GUNFIRE*


For a long time, competition between nations has been understood through military, economic, technological, and resource control. Nations with stronger weapons, larger economies, and more advanced technology are considered to have strategic advantage.


That view is not wrong, but it is incomplete.


In modern geopolitical development, nations also compete to influence how other nations and the international community understand an event, assess a policy, and take a stance.


The meaning of a conflict can be contested even before war begins. Military action can be presented as self-defense, economic pressure can be portrayed as a reasonable policy, and national interests can be packaged as common interests.


World competition thus does not only take place in the scramble for territory, markets, energy, and technology. Competition also takes place in shaping perception, trust, legitimacy, and international support.


This is one of the important spaces in the study of Cognitive Warfare.


*2. WHAT IS ACTUALLY BEING CONTESTED?*


Cognitive warfare is a term used in various studies to discuss competition or efforts to influence human thinking processes, perception, beliefs, and decision-making of individuals and groups.


However, this term does not yet have a single universal definition agreed upon by all parties. Moreover, not all inter-state communication activities can be called cognitive warfare. Perception-influencing activities in peacetime also do not automatically mean a country is conducting an act of war.


Therefore, several concepts need to be distinguished.


- Public diplomacy: open communication from one country to the public of another country to explain policies, interests, and its views.

- Soft power: the ability to influence other parties through the attraction of culture, values, education, reputation, and policies, not through coercion.

- Information operations: planned activities to influence the information environment and the understanding of a target.

- Disinformation: dissemination of false information carried out intentionally to mislead.

- Cognitive Warfare: a broader term to discuss competition that seeks to influence how humans and institutions understand reality and make decisions.


This distinction is important. A nation has the right to explain its interests and defend its views in the international world. Problems arise when communication turns into hidden manipulation, falsification, or systematic efforts to damage the ability of other parties to understand reality.


Thus, the target of cognitive competition is not just making people believe in a message, but influencing how they assess a situation and determine choices.


*3. STRATEGIC NARRATIVE: HOW NATIONS SHAPE THE MEANING OF EVENTS*


In international relations, the term strategic narrative is known.


A strategic narrative is a series of explanations that connect a country`s history, identity, interests, and goals to shape understanding of an issue.


Each country has an interest in explaining its actions to its own people and to the international world.


In geopolitical competition, for example, a country may emphasize:


- Sovereignty and territorial integrity.

- Freedom of navigation and trade.

- Regional stability.

- The right to determine one`s own future.

- National security.

- Justice in international relations.


These values can be interpreted differently by countries with different interests.


One party may call its actions an effort to maintain stability. Another party may judge it as pressure or a threat to its interests.


Narrative competition then develops into competition for legitimacy: who is considered to have the strongest reasons, who is trusted, and who gets support.


However, strategic narrative does not always mean lying. Narratives built on facts, consistent policies, and open explanations are a legitimate part of diplomacy. Problems arise when narratives are deliberately built through falsification, concealment of sources, or manipulation of facts.


Therefore, narrative mastery is not just the ability to speak louder. It requires facts, policy consistency, credibility, and the ability to explain interests convincingly.


*4. RUSSIA-UKRAINE: A WAR THAT ALSO CONTESTS WORLD SUPPORT*


The Russia-Ukraine war shows that armed conflict does not only take place on the physical battlefield.


Both sides also seek to influence the understanding of their own people and the international community towards the war.


Russia uses narrative to justify its actions, influence views on Ukraine, and reduce international support for Kyiv.


Conversely, Ukraine uses strategic communication to explain its struggle to defend sovereignty, maintain the support of its own people, and obtain international assistance.


Research by Jiayue Li and Baohui Zhang published online on September 4, 2026 discusses how both countries use cognitive competition to influence the strategic outcome of the war. The study explains that the ability to build support and influence perception can be a source of strength for a materially weaker country.


However, one thing must be emphasized: the fact that both parties use strategic communication does not mean their legal position and responsibility in the conflict become the same.


The United Nations General Assembly through Resolution ES-11/1 dated March 2, 2022 condemned the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops. Thus, analysis of narrative competition should not obscure the facts and legal standing.


The important lesson from this case is that international support is not only determined by military strength. The ability to explain facts, maintain credibility, and build trust also affects a country`s diplomatic room for maneuver.


*5. SOUTH CHINA SEA: CONTEST FOR INFLUENCE AND LEGITIMACY*


The competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region does not only take place through naval power, trade, and technology.


Competition also takes place through explanations of who is considered to maintain stability, who is considered to disturb the region, and how international rules should be interpreted.


In the South China Sea dispute, there are differences in narratives regarding sovereignty, maritime rights, freedom of navigation, and the presence of military forces in the region.


Research by Rebecca Strating published online on March 20, 2026 in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations discusses US-China narrative competition in the South China Sea.


One concept discussed is narrative Doppelgängers, namely mirroring of narratives: the use of terms, images, identities, or appearances that resemble the other party, but carry different political messages and conclusions. The goal can be to create confusion about the source, intent, and truth of information.


The study refers to Graphika`s 2020 findings on a network of fake accounts spreading messages related to the South China Sea. In the example discussed, there were fake posts defending the militarization of China`s artificial islands and cornering the United States and Western countries.


What needs Indonesia`s attention: the study also noted that similar posts had targeted Indonesian audiences. This is an example that refers to findings in 2020, not evidence that the same operation is currently ongoing.


Influence competition is also not only carried out by one party. Reuters in 2024 revealed a secret operation by the US military during the COVID-19 pandemic that used fake accounts to question the safety of Sinovac vaccines and health assistance from China in the Philippines and a number of developing countries. The Pentagon later called the COVID-19-related message a misstep and said its campaign had been stopped in August 2021.


These two examples show that influence operations can be carried out by different actors and must be judged based on evidence, not based on political partisanship.


For Indonesia, this issue is directly related to national interests, sovereign rights in sea areas, relations with neighboring countries, and regional stability.


Indonesia is not a country that claims ownership of the main islands in the South China Sea, but has maritime interests and sovereign rights in the North Natuna Sea area. Therefore, Indonesia must be able to distinguish the interests of other countries from the interests of its own nation.


*6. INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: WHEN COMPETITION TAKES PLACE COVERTLY*


Not all narrative competition takes place openly.


There are also activities that use networks of fake accounts, fake sites, intermediaries, and hidden funding sources to create the impression that a view comes from society naturally.


One term used by the European Union is Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), namely manipulation and interference of information by foreign parties.


The fourth annual report of the European External Action Service (EEAS) published on March 12, 2026 recorded 540 FIMI incidents detected and analyzed during 2025. The report also mapped about 10,500 channels and sites involved in the identified incidents.


In the attribution classification of the report, 29 percent were associated with Russia, 6 percent related to China, while 65 percent could not be definitively attributed.


That figure must be read correctly. This is the result of EEAS monitoring and analysis based on its methodology, not a census of all information operations in the world. The large portion of unattributed also shows that determining the perpetrator is not always easy.


The strategic lesson is that influence operations do not always appear as direct state action. There may be involvement of intermediaries, hidden networks, or parties who spread messages without understanding the overall purpose of the campaign.


Therefore, analysis should not only ask: who delivers the message?


We also need to ask: who benefits, how is the distribution pattern, is there coordination, and is there evidence of connection with certain parties?


Not every anonymous account, criticism, or different opinion is a foreign operation. Judgment must be based on verifiable evidence.


*7. WHERE DOES THE COGNITIVE GUERRILLA PRINCIPLE WORK?*


This is where the relationship of geopolitical competition with Cognitive Guerrilla becomes important.


Cognitive Guerrilla in this study is an analytical framework that applies guerrilla warfare principles into the space of information and perception. This framework is not an official NATO doctrine or a universally validated theory.


In conventional war, the weaker party does not always face large forces directly. It can choose terrain, momentum, and opponent vulnerabilities to maintain resilience and pursue its goals.


In cognitive competition, the asymmetric principle can be understood through several conditions.


First, power inequality does not always determine outcome. Smaller countries can strengthen their position through international law, diplomacy, cooperation, and world community support.


Second, the battlefield is not only physical territory. Reputation, legitimacy, trust, and inter-state relations are also decisive spaces.


Third, momentum can change position. An event can increase world attention to issues that were previously less noticed.


Fourth, adaptability determines resilience. A country must be able to improve its communication and policies when facing changing situations.


Fifth, trust is strategic capital. Narratives that do not correspond to facts may gain momentary attention, but are difficult to maintain legitimacy in the long term.


Thus, Cognitive Guerrilla should not be narrowed down to activities of spreading propaganda or manipulating society. The essence is understanding inequality, vulnerability, momentum, and resilience in competition influencing perception and decisions.


*8. INDONESIA: FREE AND ACTIVE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY ABILITY TO READ COMPETITION*


Indonesia is in a region that is one of the centers of world geopolitical competition.


The United States, China, Japan, India, Australia, and various other powers have interests in the Indo-Pacific. Their competition touches trade, technology, investment, maritime security, energy, and diplomatic relations.


In that situation, a free and active foreign policy has strategic meaning.


Free does not mean having no stance. Active does not mean following the interests of other countries. Indonesia must be able to determine its stance based on national interests, constitution, international law, and the interest of peace.


ASEAN`s view of the Indo-Pacific or ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), agreed in 2019, emphasizes openness, inclusiveness, cooperation, respect for international law, and ASEAN centrality.


That principle is important to prevent Southeast Asia from merely becoming an arena for great power contestation.


Indonesia`s foreign policy direction for the 2025-2029 period has also been poured into Minister of Foreign Affairs Regulation No. 10 of 2025 concerning the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its priorities include sovereignty diplomacy, economic diplomacy, increasing Indonesia`s influence in the region and the world, and protection of Indonesian citizens.


However, foreign policy is not enough only stated in documents. Indonesia also needs to be able to explain its interests consistently to its own people and the international world.


There are several things that need to be strengthened:


1. Clarity of national interest. Indonesia must consistently explain interests of sovereignty, sovereign rights, maritime security, and people`s welfare.

2. Strength of international diplomacy and communication. Indonesia`s stance must be conveyed with data, legal basis, and credible explanations.

3. Ability to read narrative competition. Government needs to understand how international issues are formed and how they impact Indonesia`s interests.

4. Independence of strategic judgment. Indonesia should not make decisions only because of pressure of opinion or narrative from major powers.

5. Strengthening ASEAN`s role. Indonesia needs to help keep the region as a space for cooperation, not a field of confrontation of great powers.


Indonesia does not have to be part of a particular bloc to have influence. What is needed is a clear stance, diplomatic ability, and consistency in fighting for national interests.


*9. BUILDING RESILIENCE WITHOUT SILENCING DISSENT*


Facing cognitive competition does not mean the government must control all information or consider every criticism as a threat.


A strong nation must be able to distinguish legitimate criticism, difference of opinion, open propaganda, and manipulation operations carried out covertly.


NATO`s approach to facing information threats emphasizes the ability to recognize, prevent, handle, and recover from the impact of information threats. The approach also states the importance of freedom of expression, democracy, and rule of law.


There are several steps that Indonesia needs to pay attention to:


- Improving ability to check facts and sources of information.

- Building inter-agency coordination in understanding information threats.

- Strengthening community media literacy so as not to be easily trapped by false information.

- Conveying policies openly, quickly, and consistently.

- Protecting freedom of press, freedom of opinion, and academic space.

- Acting against manipulation or legal violations based on evidence and legal process, not based on differences in political views.


This principle is important for Indonesia.


Cognitive resilience is not built by making people afraid to speak. Resilience is built through a critical society, trustworthy institutions, and a government that dares to explain facts.


*10. CLOSING: A STRONG NATION MUST BE ABLE TO DETERMINE ITS OWN WORLDVIEW*


World competition has developed far beyond the scramble for military and economic power.


Nations not only try to enlarge their own power, but also try to influence how other parties understand the situation, assess interests, and determine choices.


Russia-Ukraine shows how narrative and international support become part of war competition. The South China Sea shows how legitimacy, law, and regional perception become part of great power competition.


For Indonesia, the lesson is not choosing whose narrative to follow.


The lesson is to build the ability to read, test, and determine stance based on national interests and accountable facts.


In the Cognitive Guerrilla framework, strength is not always determined by who is biggest or loudest in conveying messages. Advantage is also determined by ability to understand terrain, recognize vulnerability, utilize momentum, adapt, and maintain trust.


A nation that loses the ability to think independently will be easily directed by the interests of other parties. Conversely, a nation that has resilience in thinking, clarity of interests, and trust in its institutions will be more able to determine the direction of its own future.


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*REFERENCES*


1. Li, J., & Zhang, B. (2026). Shaping Advantages: Cognitive Warfare, Strategic Competition, and the Ukraine War. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Published online September 4, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2026.2721506


2. Strating, R. (2026). Muddying the Waters: Narrative Doppelgängers, Information Operations and US–China Competition in the South China Sea. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Published online March 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481261426798


3. European External Action Service (EEAS). (2026). 4th EEAS Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats. March 12, 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en


4. Reuters. (2024). U.S. Told Philippines It Made Missteps in Secret Anti-Vax Propaganda Effort. July 26, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-told-philippines-it-made-missteps-secret-anti-vax-propaganda-effort-2024-07-26/


5. United Nations General Assembly. (2022). Resolution ES-11/1: Aggression against Ukraine. March 2, 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965290


6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2024). NATO`s Approach to Counter Information Threats. October 18, 2024. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2024/10/18/natos-approach-to-counter-information-threats


7. ASEAN. (2019). ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. June 23, 2019. https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/


8. Republic of Indonesia. (2025). Minister of Foreign Affairs Regulation Number 10 of 2025 concerning Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2025-2029. https://www.peraturan.go.id/files/permenlu-no-10-tahun-2025.pdf


Jakarta, November 17, 2026

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) MJP. Hutagaol

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